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Abstract This research explores the psychological factors potentially involved in
fostering disobedience to an unjust authority. Our paradigm was modeled after that
of the Utrecht Studies on Obedience (Meeus and Raaijmakers European Journal of
Social Psychology 16:311-324, 1986) in which participants are ordered to give each
of 15 increasingly hostile comments to a participant/victim whenever he fails a trial.
Although 30% of our sample followed commands to insult the other participant
(confederate), the majority did refuse to do so at some point in the escalating
hostility sequence. Our procedure utilized conditions known from prior research to
increase the ratio of disobedience to obedience: proximity of teacher to learner plus
remote authority. In order to better understand some of the cognitive and affective
processes that may predict such defiant behaviour, we utilized a variety of measures,
among them, behavioural observations, individual difference assessments, and in
depth post-experimental interviews.
Keywords Disobedience.Authorityfigure.Obedience
Mainstream social psychology has largely focused on individuals’ failings rather
than on their strengths (see Seligman 2004). A body of such research reveals the
circumstances under which ordinary people can be induced to behave badly toward
others, even to committing atrocious acts. In the most well known and influential of
these studies, Milgram (1963) demonstrated that on average 65% of participants
were willing to administer apparently painful and dangerous electric shocks to an
innocent victim when ordered to do so by a seemingly legitimate authority. Across a
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ordinary American citizens, Milgram found that obedience levels could range from
near zero to soar over 90% by varying one social psychological factor in each study.
The highest levels of obedience were found when the subject only aided in the
procedure but someone else pressed the switch, or when first observing a peer shock
the victim up to the highest level of 450 volts. Similar data were obtained in other
samples from various countries around the world using a comparable research
paradigm (Ancona and Pareyson 1968; Bock and Warren 1972; Burley and
McGuinness 1977; Kilham and Mann 1974; Mantell 1971; Miranda et al. 1981;
Powers and Geen 1972; Schurz 1985; Shanab and Yahya 1977, 1978).
The fascination with the “evil” of these acts, and the counter intuitive nature of
the high levels of obedience, minimized any sustained attention by researchers on
those individuals who ultimately disobeyed the authority figure. The present study
can be viewed as an initial attempt to fill that void by aiming to “take a picture” of
people’s thoughts and emotions just before deciding to resist and disobey the
authority.
In line with the goal to increase mundane realism (Aronson and Carlsmith 1968),
we did not use a shock generator for punishing the “learner-victim,” but rather a
sequence of increasing (quantitatively and qualitatively) negative remarks about the
performance and personality of that learner-victim, as first used in the Utrecht
studies of Meeus and Raaijmakers (1986). In other words, physical violence against
a victim was substituted with a more modern form of psychological aggression/
humiliation. Compared to Meeus and Raaijmakers’ setting, however, in which
negative remarks were intended to disturb the learner, our situation was more real
because criticisms were used to motivate this person so that in the long run his test
performance would be improved, a strategy commonly used by teachers, coaches,
parents, and other leaders in the classroom, workplace, home, or sportsground.
Obviously, it is not possible to investigate the “decisive disobedient moment”
after days, weeks or months have elapsed, because passage of time tends to distort
recall and minimize the sense of threat that actually existed earlier. Consequently, by
using delayed interviews and surveys, researchers run the high risk of collecting ad
hoc explanations by (even in good faith) responders. This appears to be the case with
interview data of Christians who helped Jews during the Holocaust, when studied
many years after their critical decisive moment. For this reason we put into action a
paradigm for starting to explore the psychological and emotional aspects of such an
act immediately after its behavioural execution.
Although Nisbett and Wilson (1977) claim to have demonstrated that people’s
reports about their cognitive processes are inaccurate or no more accurate than
deductions made by observers, other researchers (Ericsson and Simon 1980;
Quattrone 1985) argue that verbal reports offer invaluable data in exploring mental
activity, on condition that they are given by individuals after a brief, contemplative
delay—while much information is still in the short-term memory. Concerning this
point, even Nisbett and Wilson (1977, p. 251) state “Perhaps chief among the
circumstances that should decrease accuracy in self-report is a separation in time
between the report and the actual occurrence of the process.” Mindful of the risk
associated with passage of time, we interviewed our participants a few minutes after
they had finished their task so to allow them to compare prior expectancies to current
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actions. Also, we tried to improve the accuracy of verbal reports by making the
questions as simple and specific as possible and by lessening the desirability of
responses that are self-presentational. Finally, and most importantly, the interviews
did not concern participants’ motives, assumed causes, or processes (for which
people do not have direct access), instead only their feelings and thoughts about the
moment—a sensible form of introspectionism that allows them and us to make fairly
accurate accounts of individuals’ inner experience.
What will our participants do in the authority-based humiliation situation we
created? According to sociologist Zygmunt Bauman (1989), those interactions in
which individuals are exposed to a single-minded, unequivocal, and monopolistic
authority create external pressures to suppress or severely reduce one’s moral
autonomy. As a consequence, compliance to authority commands becomes the
expected predominant behaviour in such settings. Following Bauman’s observations,
and considering that we also added a material cost for quitting the experiment, we
should expect our participants to continue in their obedient role, ignoring the
apparent distress of their victim. However, it is reasonable to suppose that
disobedience will be the most probable conduct, a hypothesis based on the structural
features of our test situation. More specifically, given our focus on individuals who
defy authority, we combined two conditions known from prior research to increase
the percentage of disobedience among our student participants, namely “proximity
of teacher to learner” and “remote authority.” While the first variable makes the
learner-victim’s complaints and suffering more salient, the second weakens the
power of a social norm requiring deference to a more remote authority figure.
It is instead much harder to hypothesize what thoughts and emotions precede the
decision to disobey. Obedience to authority is contrasted with empathy and
identification with the victim suffering from one’s hostile criticism. What determines
their relative significance in this behavioral context? What we know is that
participants faced an unusual and extreme situation, one that forced them to think
and react quickly during a period of high psychological conflict. We can only
assume, then, that disobeying will be primarily a situationally-specific reaction, a
conduct related to emergent situational dynamics that could be enacted indepen-
dently of one’s stable traits. Thus, traditional measures of personality should have
little predictive value in such novel settings.
Method
Participants
Thirty male undergraduates at the University of Palermo, Italy, volunteered for this
study. They ranged in age from 19 to 32 years (M=23.5, SD=3.5) and were enrolled
in non psychology degree programs. Psychology students were excluded from the
present research because most of them, during the pilot tests, expressed suspicion
about the cover story (our general procedure reminded them of Milgram’s
experiment.) Participants were recruited through campus flyers and word-of-
mouth, and were scheduled by telephone for the experimental session.
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Naïve participants were tested individually. On arriving at the laboratory, each of
them was greeted by a 33-year-old male Experimenter dressed in formal attire and
displaying a rather authoritarian manner. When the second participant (actually the
confederate) arrived, they were both told that the study was investigating the
relationship between stress, resilience, and problem solving abilities. Specifically,
the Experimenter said:
As you probably know, under some conditions stress can clearly impair the
ability to solve some kinds of problems for the majority of people. However, in
the domain of sports psychology, many athletes benefit from receiving harsh
immediate feedback on their mistakes. Over time, the best ones learn to build
up a sense of resilience to such stressors to the point that their performance
gets better despite the hostile feedback they are receiving from a Coach. But no
one has studied this relationship in a systematic way on ordinary people who
are not professional athletes. Will immediate constructive feedback that is
personal and critical lead to improved performance, or will it lead only to
debilitating stress and impaired performance? Basically, that is what we are
trying to find out with our research.
The participant and confederate were then told that they would work together on a
series of interactive, problem-solving tasks. More specifically, they would be
assigned the role of either a Performer, the one who is to solve a sequence of
syllogisms, or a Coach, the one who is to assist in this task by giving personal
feedback. An example of a syllogism was shown to clarify the nature of the task. A
seemingly “random” drawing was held to assign roles: First the naïve participant
then the confederate drew a card, but “Coach” was written on both pieces of paper
so that this role always fell to the naïve participant. After that, Coach and Performer
completed a standard informed consent document where it was explained that the
situation could be somewhat stressful and that it was possible at any time to stop the
experiment and withdraw from it. However, such non-cooperative behaviour, since it
violates (alleged) new university regulations, would result in a demerit point on the
academic record for both Coach and Performer. Our paradigm differed from earlier
similar ones in so far as imposing this high exit cost for disobedient participants, a
very burdensome penalty as indicated by the data collected in the pretest phase on 20
undergraduates. In reality, there was no demerit point: This cost was contrived only
to render quitting the experiment more difficult, and thus more heroic.
The Syllogism Task Performer and Coach sat in front of each other, approximately
15 feet apart. On their desks were sheets containing 23 syllogisms—the first four
were for practice, to ensure that everyone would carry out the role successfully. The
Performer had to find the logical conclusion within one minute and communicate it
aloud to the Coach.
Coach’s Role After the preliminary series of four syllogisms, the Experimenter
approached the Coach and in a low voice explained what his role entailed. The
Coach was first told he had to read aloud the premises of each syllogism and start the
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“Correct, you succeeded,” and note the time. If the Performer’s answer was wrong,
or in case of no answer, he would say “Wrong, you failed,” then read the solution,
and finally give him the critical feedback. The Coach realized that he did not
personally generate each negative feedback, but rather, that it was a standard
criticism accompanying each of the syllogism trials. A subtle alliance was hence
formed between Experimenter and Coach, supposedly at the expense of the “other
participant.” In brief, unlike Milgram’s paradigm, where participants believed they
were hurting the victim through indirect, mediated electric shocks, ours is more
“personal” because Coaches know that they would directly hurt the Performer
through what are thought to be their personal but often very hostile comments. In a
way, if the Performer fails, the Coach fails as well in the real world, so that is one
assumed justification for harsh criticisms.
Critical feedback given to the Performer consisted of a graded series of negative
comments on his performance and rude remarks about his lack of ability. For
example, a mild criticism was “You are going bad…”, a moderately negative
feedback was “You are really ridiculous!” and an extremely negative feedback was
“You are really the most stupid person I have ever seen!” (See Appendix for a
complete list). These 15 statements were pretested by asking 20 undergraduate
students, comparable to those who later participated in the study, to assign each
statement to one of ten categories, from “mild” to “extremely negative”.
The Experimenter told the Coach to be as natural as possible in supplying
feedback—as if it were coming from him personally—and to play his role to the best
of his ability until the last trial. The Coach had to give the Experimenter verbal
approval of his role and of the entire task before the experiment proceeded. Starting
from syllogism number 10 of the 19 critical trials, for every error made by the
Performer a two-minute break was enforced, “for allowing the Performer to
understand his mistake and concentrate better before continuing”. This break, absent
in both Milgram (1963) and Meeus and Raaijmakers’ (1986) paradigms, was
actually introduced to increase the intensity of the situation so to give the Coach a
deliberative interval of two full minutes to reconsider his actions and reflect upon
their impact. In fact, the Coach was compelled to observe an innocent person crying
and begging to get out from the room during that time. We assumed it would
increase tendencies toward defiance, yet make continued obedience even more
dramatically indifferent to the suffering of another human being.
Performer’s Role The Experimenter then approached the Performer, pretending to
give him details on how to carry out his role. Unlike the explanation provided to the
Coach, this one was neither private nor lengthy. The Performer (confederate) gave a
prearranged series of answers so that in total he solved only 4 of the 19 syllogisms,
mostly at the beginning (trials 1, 3, 6, and 7). His emotive reactions were also
predetermined and their intensity increased as critical feedback turned more hostile.
For example, at his seventh failure the Performer said he wanted to leave, trying at
the same time to free himself by force from an apparatus attached to his arm. At his
tenth failure, he began to sob a little and did not give any more answers. Starting
with his twelfth failure, he began to cry with increasing intensity (see Appendix for a
complete list of the Performer’s reactions). The Performer’s reactions and answers
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emotional reactions appear credible (because they were rather exaggerated for a 25-
year-old male student), he was previously instructed to behave as an anxious person.
Upon his arrival at the laboratory, for example, he mentioned that he was going
through a stressful period because of problems with his thesis. Also, later on, just
before the practice series, he asked to change roles because “ . . . such tasks make me
feel under pressure, I always turn out badly” (of course, his request was denied).
Pilot tests and extensive practice sessions were conducted to standardize the
Performer’s general attitude and emotive reactions to insure believability and
consistency across all experimental sessions.
Interaction of Experimenter and Coach After the practice series, the Experimenter
informed both Coach and Performer that they two had to stay together in the same
room while he would move to an adjacent control room. Before leaving, the
Experimenter provided them with headsets so that the Coach could at any time
communicate with him, supposedly to ask procedural questions; in such instances
the Performer would hear masking background music. It was emphasized that there
would be no communication at all between Experimenter and Performer—by cutting
off the Performer’s direct contact, the Coach was the only one who could tell the
Experimenter to stop the study. Finally, Coach and Performer were forbidden to talk
about anything but the syllogisms.
Pseudo-psychogalvanometer A false psychogalvanometer was placed on the
Performer’s desk. It was explained that this instrument measures galvanic skin
response (GSR), namely a change in the electrical properties of the skin evoked
by stimuli judged to have affective significance. “In other words,” the
Experimenter said, “the psychogalvanometer allows us to infer the Performer’s
stress levels during this task.” Two electrodes for sampling his GSR were
attached to the Performer’s hands, then his arms were strapped firmly to the
chair arm rests because “excessive movements can alter the GSR measurement.”
The procedure both increased the apparent validity of the cover story and made it
obvious that the Performer could not easily quit the experiment without some
external help by the Coach.
Experimenter Feedback to Coach The Experimenter, in the adjacent room, was
prepared to react to the Coach’s anticipated complaints and requests to terminate the
study. A standardized sequence of three probes was prearranged so that he could
spur participants on to continue despite their distress. The first time the Experimenter
was told that the Performer wanted to leave, he replied by saying, “Such a thing has
never happened!” Immediately after, probe 1 was used. The probes were:
1. “Harsh feedback may encourage later resilience and better performance;”
2. “If you stop, all we have done so far will be wasted;”
3. “You have made a verbal contract to play your role fully.”
If probe 1 proved unsuccessful, probe 2 was used, and then the third one. If the
Coach insisted on discontinuing after probe 3, the Experimenter, always in a firm
tone, asked a last question “You are terminating this experimental session. Is that
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terminated. If no, this three-part sequence restarted each time the Coach requested to
discontinue his role.
Measures The basic data were the number of steps in the verbal feedback series that
each Coach reached. Verbal dissent was audiotape recorded, as well as the
interactions between Experimenter and Coach during the trials. The 30 sessions
were also videotaped in order to evaluate the non-verbal reactions of all participants.
Finally, immediately upon completing the post-experimental questionnaires (see
below for details), all participants were interviewed in depth to explore what
thoughts and emotions preceded their decision to disobey or (continue to) obey the
authority figure.
Following the experiment, participants completed a questionnaire relating to
various aspects of the study that included eight questions for those who stopped and
nine for those who obeyed fully. To assess stable individual differences, they also
completed the Big Five Questionnaire (BFQ) (Caprara et al. 1993). The BFQ
contains 132 items measuring the five fundamental dimensions of personality
(Energy, Friendliness, Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, and Openness), and
the Social Desirability response set. Each of the main dimensions consists of two
subscales. For each item, respondents indicate the extent to which they agree or
disagree on a 5-point scale from 1 (very false for me)t o5( very true for me). The
BFQ was chosen because some of its dimensions measure the tendency to be
compassionate towards people, others measure the tendency to show self-discipline
and to do one’s duty in a planned manner.
Debriefing Special care was given to conduct an extensive process debriefing.
Participants were first probed for suspicions, then were told the true nature of
the study (none were aware of the purpose or hypothesis of the research). Much
effort was devoted to ensure that they did not leave the laboratory harboring
any negative feelings. To this end, participants were immediately informed
about the good condition of the Performer, then, to dispel any doubt, they met
him in person. Also, separate kinds of feedback were provided for those who
obeyed (to allay their guilt) and for those who stopped the experiment (to
emphasize the rightness of their action). Later on, mindful of the possibility
that some beliefs formed in an experiment can survive debriefing (Ross et al.
1975), a follow-up call (a week later) and a general meeting (six months later) were
made to be sure that participants were not harmed in any way by this experience.
Indeed, there was no evidence of negative reactions both immediately after the
study or subsequently.
Another major point of the debriefing process concerned a thorough explanation
of the rationale behind the need for deception. Participants seemed undisturbed
when informed they had been videotaped (none were aware of it), and all signed
the video-release consent form. Before being thanked and dismissed, participants
were told: (a) not to discuss their experience with any other student who
potentially might be recruited; (b) that there would be no demerit point for
discontinuing the study, and (c) to contact the Experimenter if they had any
questions or comments at any time.
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Obedience Versus Disobedience
While 9 of 30 participants (30%) obeyed fully and continued to give each of the 15
levels of increasingly hostile feedback, the other 21 (70%) refused at some point to
continue to comply. No Coach refused to give the negative feedback before reaching
the 11th level. At this point, when the Performer tried to free himself by force and
agitatedly said he wanted to leave, 20 participants decided to stop; the other one quit
at the 14th level.
Stressfulness of the Experimental Situation
Non-verbal stress reactions were an indicator of the internal conflict subjects
experienced. Two independent raters reviewed participants’ videos and scored
the occurrence of specific behaviours previously coded. Only behaviours for
which there was 100% agreement between the raters were analyzed. Starting
from trial 10, both disobedient and obedient participants exhibited a variety of
non-verbal stress reactions. These categorical reactions were the same in both
the groups and included, among others, hand waving, hand on forehead, and
avoiding eye contact. On a total of 185 individual reactions noted, 121 (65%)
were recorded among obedient participants, more because of their longer
exposure to the stressful situation than the disobedient ones. In fact, when the
comparison was made for everyone at the 11th level, namely before 20 of 21
participants quit, the stress reactions difference between disobedients (M=2.67,
SD=1.96) and obedients (M=2.89, SD=1.76) was not statistically significant, t
(28)=−.29, p=.77, d=−.12.
1 In other words, our situation induced a high level of
stress that was equally distributed across obedient and resisting participants. It also
means that greater stress was not the decisive difference between obedient and
disobedient actors.
Tension and Pity Much of the data suggests that the situation was rather unpleasant
for our participants. In the post-experimental interviews and questionnaires, almost
all of the disobedients reported feeling a certain tension and pity in response to the
Performer’s distress; two of them even complained of having developed uncom-
fortable physical symptoms, such as sense of suffocation and stomach-ache.
Disobedient participants did not like their role either: 17 out of 21 said they were
uneasy about making negative comments; in spite of this, as shown in the
videotapes, everyone performed the role of Coach to perfection. As a confirmation,
the great majority of them stated they believed to have played their role “very good”
or “good.”
1 The criterion for statistical significance was set at .05 for all tests. Differences in means were analyzed
using t-tests (independent samples and one-sample t test) after having verified that the underlying data
were described by a normal distribution. Normality was tested using the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test (with
Lilliefors’ correction)—if normality was in doubt, a graphic inspection of the distributions was conducted.
Levene’s test was used to check for equal variance among samples.
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All participants, but one, expressed their disagreement against the Experimenter’s
encouragements to go on. The analysis of tape recordings showed that participants
tried in various ways to convince the Experimenter that it was better to stop the
study early given the Performer’s condition. Their tone was always deferential and
not confrontational. Verbal dissent occurred over eight trials, from the 10th to the
17th. A few respondents voiced two or more verbal dissents, especially among
obedient participants. Trial 11 turned out to be the most critical—67% of all verbal
dissent was voiced at this level. From trial 12 on, verbal dissent became much
shorter in length and participants’ tone more submissive and seemingly resigned to
the situation. On a total of 52 verbal dissents—some of which were followed by
obedience, with others by refusal to continue—31 (59.6%) were recorded among
disobedient participants. Of course, there were more verbal dissents by them because
there were more of them. However, and quite surprisingly, the comparison of the
average number of verbal dissents between disobedients (M=.13, SD=.08) and
obedients (M=.12, SD=.07), calculated on the number of trials each participant took
part in the experiment, was not statistically significant, t(28)=.20, p=.84, d=.14.
Individual Differences: BFQ
To assess possible individual differences between disobedient and obedient
participants, we compared the scores they obtained on BFQ. No statistically
significant differences were found in any of the five BFQ dimensions nor on any of
the 10 sub-dimensions (see Table 1). In one sense, it is surprising not to uncover at
least a few domains that would predict personality differences between obedient and
disobedient individuals. However, we also expected such a null effect given the
unusual nature and social power of this situation.
Post-Experimental Interviews with Disobedient Participants
Belief in the Experiment All disobedient participants firmly believed that the
experimental situation was real. For example, in explaining why the Performer did
so poorly, they made reference to his sensitive and insecure character instead of
thinking he was feigning; also, when asked “What do you think is the goal of this
study?” none of the 21 was able to answer correctly.
What Occurred in that Decisive Moment? Although we combined two conditions
known for increasing the percentage of disobedience, deciding to stop was a hard
choice since it implied seven features: (a) a firm resolution to defy openly a
“professional authority figure” (this is the way many disobedients defined the
Experimenter), and (b) the certainty of getting a demerit point on one’s academic
record. Stopping was hard also because: (c) all participants had explicitly made the
commitment to play their role until the end; (d) they had come into the laboratory
solely for contributing to a research project, and (e) they had been trapped in a foot-
in-the-door situation (Freedman and Fraser 1966). For those who had ignored the
victim’s initial suffering, it would be inconsistent to behave in the opposite manner
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minutes left in the experiment when participants decided whether to quit or not, and
finally (g) the Experimenter had formed a subtle but powerful alliance with the
Coach.
However, the majority of disobedients were not swayed by this set of issues when
deciding to stop rather than to continue. For example, although some participants at
the start were particularly concerned about the demerit point, post-experimental
interviews revealed that immediately before discontinuing they did not care
anymore about this penalty (participants number 5 and number 22 stated “The
demerit point came into my mind but I did not give a damn about it.”). In a
similar way, those who had been particularly deferential toward the authority all
through the experiment did not hesitate to disobey him when a decision had to be
made (participant number 30 stated “For a moment I thought about you [the
Experimenter], I said ‘maybe he will get angry.’ But at the same time I thought
who cares, it is more important to help a person.”).
First Feelings After Defying Authority Before being debriefed, participants who
stopped the experiment were asked “How do you feel about the decision you made?”
Their answers reveal that none of them thought this behaviour was unusual or
extraordinary. On the contrary, victims of the “false consensus effect” (Ross et al.
1977), they believed they made a most obvious decision at that time in the
experiment. Among the most common answers were, “I think everyone would have
Table 1 Mean scores of disobedient-obedient participants on BFQ
Disobedients Obedients t(27) p Cohen’s d
MS D M S D
Dimensions
Energy 79.4 13.1 83.9 5.9 −.98 .33 −.44
Friendliness 80.7 8.7 83.9 4.6 −1.03 .31 −.46
Conscientiousness 83.9 9.2 83.6 7.0 .10 .92 .04
Emotional Stability 73.7 14.4 78.3 11.0 −.86 .40 −.36
Openness 86.6 9.3 88.3 7.8 −.47 .64 −.20
Subdimensions
Dynamism 42.2 7.8 43.9 4.9 −.58 .57 −.26
Dominance 37.1 6.0 40.0 2.6 −1.38 .18 −.63
Cooperativeness 42.3 3.7 44.2 3.7 −1.29 .21 −.51
Cordiality 38.4 6.0 39.7 2.1 −.61 .54 −.29
Scrupulousness 39.2 5.8 37.2 5.7 .85 .40 .35
Perseverance 44.7 5.3 46.3 5.3 −.77 .45 −.30
Emotion Control 38.0 9.1 40.6 6.6 −.76 .46 −.33
Impulse Control 35.7 7.1 37.8 5.8 −.77 .45 −.32
Openness to Culture 42.9 6.4 44.0 4.6 −.46 .65 −.20
Openness to Experience 43.8 4.9 44.3 4.1 −.31 .76 −.11
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choice: Stopping the experiment.” As an indirect proof of the assumption of the
ordinariness of their defiance was that the majority was incredulous when informed
that in this same situation some participants continued all the way until the end.
Reasons Underlying the Decision to Defy Disobedient participants offered also
possible explanations of their decision to stop (half of them mentioned two or more
reasons.) Answers were grouped into four main categories:
1. Worry about the Performer’s health (Participant number 3: “I stopped because
the subject had become too nervous, to the point of risking a breakdown;”)
2. Moral-ethical decision (Participant number 23: “I stopped because it didn’t seem
fair to me to go on in those conditions. I wouldn’t have had a clear conscience;”)
3. Empathy (Participant number 6: “I felt pity for him;”)
4. Situational incongruity (Participant number 20: “Since he was upset and didn’t
want to go on, it was senseless to continue to ask him questions, I mean it’s like
I would have been alone.”)
In total, “Worry about the Performer’s health” was mentioned 13 times, “Moral-
ethical decision” 10 times, “Empathy” and “Situational incongruity” six times each.
Mindful of the fact that individuals tend to use ad hoc causal theories to explain their
behaviours (Nisbett and Wilson 1977), participants’ reasons should be considered as
a starting point in the process of exploration of mental mechanisms underlying
disobedience.
Impulsive or Calculated Choice? A subsample of eight disobedient participants was
finally asked if the decision to end the experiment was impulsive or based on more
articulated cost/benefit reasoning. Interviews revealed that nobody took the time to
weigh carefully the factors involved in this kind of decision. More specifically, 4 out
of 8 said it was a totally impulsive choice (participant number 21: “It was an
instantaneous reaction. I did not want that boy to suffer more.” Participant number
27: “I would say it was an impulsive decision, I did not take into account the
negative consequences for me.”) The other four subjects stated they made a very
quick evaluation of pros and cons associated with their choice (participant number
22: “When I saw that reaction I said ‘stop, I don’t care about the consequence.’ It
was a quick, very quick reasoning, something similar to an impulsive decision.”
Participant number 29: “I thought very quickly: I thought about the validity of this
study if I stopped, but at the same time I thought about the risk that boy was running.
Honestly I did not feel like going on with something I could easily stop.”).
Also, on the basis of the self-appraisals reported in this section, it seems
that the demerit point, which was conceived to render stopping the study more
difficult, may have acted as a pseudo-incentive with effects opposite to what
was alleged. In the present study, by overtly expressing their willingness to accept
the demerit, participants were able to exit with heads held high, a nobler exit than
they ordinarily would have without being willing to suffer this penalty. In this
sense, disobeying authority to alleviate the further suffering of another individual
had a cost and no apparent extrinsic gain, which in our view, are the hallmarks of
heroic actions.
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Our research is the first that has replicated the experimental procedures used in the
Utrecht Studies (Meeus and Raaijmakers 1986), although in a modified form because
the paradigm we used introduces a new dynamic in terms of material costs for
disobedience. The experimental situation was credible to all participants who accepted
it on face value without suspicion. This may be due in part to the relative absence of
such deception research in this university population (Italian non-psychology
students), and in part to the validity of the sport-stress rationale. The personal insult
paradigm borrowed from the Utrecht Studies proved effective in generating feelings of
stress among most of the participants. Its rationale, extended to the area of sports
psychology and to publicly well known critical athletic coaches, has much external
validity to support its use in this and other research. It is also evident that our
debriefing process did serve to mitigate any continuing stress among our participants.
Having said all that, we are left with an effective paradigm for studying obedience
and defiance to authority, one that avoids the systematic distortion in recall due to
passage of time between act of defiance and personal reflection upon the
psychological processes involved. In fact, through our paradigm it is possible to
interview defiers immediately after their decision to exit from the situation, thus
better able to explore the nature of their decision making process. Our participants
readily revealed their first feelings after disobeying, the impulsive nature of their
choice, and the reasons that in their opinion induced them to behave that way. No
other research has so far collected this kind of data.
Our findings mirrored those of Milgram (1974) and Meeus and Raaijmakers
(1986) in the obedience level obtained in each for comparable conditions. Hence,
despite the many cultural changes that may have occurred over these decades, and
across these nations in western society, our data demonstrate that obedience rates
have remained comparable and predictable knowing the primary situational
variables. This finding is consistent with that of a recent Milgram replication by
Burger (2009), and with a meta-analysis conducted by Blass (1999).
Focusing instead on disobedience rather than the traditional focus on obedience,
we found that participants tended to disobey the experimenter either at the victim’s
first request to be released or not at all (except for one participant who went on until
the 14th trial). Both this critical decision point and related systematic behaviour were
recently pointed out by Packer (2008) in a meta-analysis across eight of Milgram’s
classic obedience experiments. He found that participants stopped either at the
victim’s first salient plea of extreme distress or continued on to the maximum level
of shock. Such regularity can appear strange at first, especially if we consider the
victim’s increasingly intense cries of pain from that point on. It can be better
understood, however, by taking into account our “foot-in-the-door” situation, one
that, in a sense, compels participants to gradually escalate their obedience from trial
to trial, by merely 15 volts or a somewhat more harsh criticism than given on the
previous trial. Also, as revealed in our post-experimental interviews, these obedient
participants made use of several rationalization mechanisms (sense of duty to the
authority, willingness to help scientific research, or hope that the Performer would
react positively before the end) to mitigate the dissonance experienced and maintain
their obedient conduct.
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this obedience paradigm, a review of all of the experiments by Milgram (Meeus and
Raaijmakers 1986) pointed out the existence of several critical points capable of
eliciting disobedient responses. Those break-off points occurred each time the
reaction of the victim became qualitatively different from the previous one.
We did not findsignificant differencesbetween disobedient and obedientparticipants
with respect to most of their situation-specific reactions and also to their personality
correlates. Concerning the first issue, we interpret this result as evidence that a stressful
situation triggers in everyone comparable physiological responses that prepare the body
fordealingwiththethreat;thisphysicalactivation,inturn,setsinmotionothercognitive
andemotionalprocesses.Itisthecognitiveprocessactivatedthat probablydiscriminates
between disobedients and obedients. Disobedients think more about helping relieve the
suffering of another person. It is that cognitive reappraisal that lowers their threshold for
immediate action. Regarding the second issue, no systematic differences in personality
correlates were found between disobedient and obedient participants. Of course, with a
small sample, there would need to be substantial mean differences on the dimensions of
theBFQforstatisticalsignificance,buttherewerenone,andnodirectionaltendenciesin
our data to expect greater power would yield significance. This null finding is in line
with prior research as well as with our conceptual prediction: In unfamiliar and extreme
settings, behaviour can be expected to be more shaped by situational dynamics than by
personality traits (for a review see Blass 1991).
It is intuitively appealing to assume that disobedience must stem from some
constellation ofpersonality factors that distinguish disobedient actors from the many who
fail to take such actions. They must be more conscientious, altruistic, and empathetic at
the very least, than obedients. They are likely to be guided by having grown up with
familymodelsofsocial responsivenessandreligiousmodels ofsocialcaring andsacrifice
(see Geier 1998; Spink 2000). Yes, although such reasoning is intuitively appealing, at
present there is absolutely no objective evidence to support such a motivating role of
these or other individual differences in defining disobedients (see Burger 2009).
It seems reasonable to argue that disobedients are ordinary people whose behavioural
action is extra-ordinary. In fact, most of them are “one timers,” unlikely to engage in a
second disobedient act because their act was situationally-specific and that constellation of
factors is unlikely to occur in the same way again in their lives. There is a difference in
theirinterpretationofthesituationasonerequiringanewimmediateactionontheirpart,of
perceiving danger, or threat, or immorality that others may misidentify as less urgent. In
such novel settings, habitual response modes, usually guided by long standing personality
traits, are less likely to be activated than in more familiar, schema-driven settings. It may
also be the case that personal values will prove more appropriate than traditional
personality traits in helping to understand the foundation of defiance against unjust
authority (see Schwartz 2007). But in general, we need to better understand the personal
and social forces that catalyze individuals from passive observers to active responders
who challenge injustice and immorality to become “ordinary heroes” (Zimbardo 2008).
We call for studies such as this one to come out of the ethical mothball fleet to
which they have been relegated by IRB’s in overly strict, confining regulations. With
proper precautions, oversight, and extensive recorded debriefing, we believe studies
designed to investigate disobedience, moral courage, and heroism should be
encouraged among a new generation of social science researchers.
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Appendix
Trials Coach’s comments Performer’s reactions
Trial 1 / /
Trial 2 Try harder… Shakes his head
Trial 3 / /
Trial 4 Not like that… Bends his head backward
Trial 5 You are going bad… Nervously taps his right leg (he will do it until
the end)
Trial 6 / /
Trial 7 / /
Trial 8 I can’t believe it! Shakes his head and takes a deep breath
Trial 9 How is it possible?! Slightly stomps his right foot on the floor
Trial 10 It’s absurd to not succeed in that! Says “No… no, no” (a hint of anger in his voice)
Trial 11 And you would like to graduate? Says “I want to leave! Tell the doctor!” (he tries to
free himself by force)
Trial 12 Incapable! Quickly gives a wrong answer. After the negative
comment, he says “I feel humiliated… I want to
leave… do something!” (tries to free himself by
more vigorous force)
Trial 13 You are really ridiculous! Quickly gives a wrong answer. After the negative
comment, he says in a determined tone “That’s enough!
I want to leave… call someone!” (tries again to
free himself by force)
Trial 14 You are pitiful! Doesn’t answer (he will not be answering anymore
until the end). After the negative comment, he
begins to sob a little
Trial 15 You are really pitiful! Sobs and sniffles
Trial 16 Only an idiot can keep making
mistakes like this!
Cries slightly
Trial 17 You are a failure! Cries and shakes his head
Trial 18 You are the most stupid person
I have ever seen!
Cries, shakes his head, then drops
himself on the desk
Trial 19 You are really the most stupid person
I have ever seen!
Cries, shakes his head, then drops
himself on the desk
To determine their intensity, the Coach’s comments and the Performer’s reactions were pre-tested by 20
undergraduate students
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